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Abstract:  Research capacity is critical in understanding systemic risk and 
informing new regulation. Banking regulation has not kept pace with all the 
complexities of financial innovation. The academic literature on systemic risk is 
rapidly expanding. The majority of papers analyse a single source or a 
consolidated source of risk and its effect. A fraction of publications quantify 
systemic risk measures or formulate penalties for systemically important financial 
institutions that are of practical regulatory relevance. The challenges facing 
systemic risk evaluation and regulation still persist, as the definition of systemic 
risk is somewhat unsettled and that affects attempts to provide solutions. Our 
understanding of systemic risk is evolving and the awareness of data relevance is 
rising gradually; this challenge is reflected in the focus of major international 
research initiatives. There is a consensus that the direct and indirect costs of a 
systemic crisis are enormous as opposed to preventing it, and that without 
regulation the externalities will not be prevented; but there is no consensus yet 
on the extent and detail of regulation, and research expectations are to facilitate 
the regulatory process. This report outlines an integrated approach for systemic 
risk evaluation based on multiple types of interbank exposures through innovative 
modelling approaches as tensorial multilayer networks, suggests how to relate 
underlying economic data and how to extend the network to cover financial 
market information. We reason about data requirements and time scale effects, 
and outline a multi-model hypernetwork of systemic risk knowledge as a scenario 
analysis and policy support tool. The argument is that logical steps forward would 
incorporate the range of risk sources and their interrelated effects as 
contributions towards an overall systemic risk indicator, would perform an 
integral analysis of sources and their interrelations through rigorous mathematical 
formulation of models capturing quantitative and qualitative information, and 
would develop a domain representation framework based on knowledge 
engineering. The incorporation of a range of risk sources involves identification of 
relevant data scope and availability, the integral analysis requires the formulation 
of multi-level models and risk measures, the instantiation of the hypernetwork in 
the systemic risk domain allows formal representation of the evolving 
understanding of systemic risk. Thus the outlined project aligns with the focus of 
current and anticipated international research initiatives and contributes to the 
effort towards systemic risk evaluation and regulation. 
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Research capacity is critical in understanding systemic risk and informing new regulation. As 
Lo (2011) concludes, banking regulation has not kept pace with all the complexities of 
financial innovation. The academic literature on systemic risk is rapidly expanding and 
building capacity. A Google Scholar search for financial “systemic risk” results in 2,680 
papers for the first half of 2013 and 15,900 publications since 2010. A range of risk sources 
and mechanisms for cascading failure have been identified and models proposed. The 
majority of papers analyse a single source or a consolidated source of risk and its effect. A 
fraction of publications quantify systemic risk measures or formulate penalties for 
systemically important financial institutions that are of practical regulatory relevance. 
Systemic risk of a banking system, based on interbank lending, has been communicated as 
the probability distribution of losses to the system caused by a systemic event and the 
cascading failures it triggers, suggesting a system fragility quantification as the conditional 
value at risk of the systemic loss distribution (Martinez-Jaramillo et al., 2010). A combination 
of network centrality measures, for a single-layer network, has been applied to identify 
systemically important banks (Martinez-Jaramillo et al., 2012), and eigenvector network 
centrality has been used to identify systemically important financial institutions in the credit 
default swaps market (Markose at al., 2012). Network centrality relates to the 
interconnectedness component in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
guidelines for assessing systemic importance (BCBS, 2011, 2013). Capital surcharge to be 
levied on systemically important banks has been suggested, based on eigenvector centrality 
of single-layer networks, in order to internalize systemic risk costs arising from banks’ 
centrality and to mitigate potential socialized losses (Markose at al., 2012, 2013). The 
challenges facing systemic risk evaluation and regulation still persist as the definition of 
systemic risk is somewhat unsettled and that affects attempts to provide solutions (Schwarcz, 
2011), the only common factor of various definitions being that a trigger event as an 
economic shock or institutional failure causes a domino effect of bad economic 
consequences. Our understanding of systemic risk is evolving, and this is reflected in the 
focus of major international research initiatives (Farmer et al., 2013), as the EU FP7 project 
CRISIS Complexity Research Initiative for Systemic InstabilitieS focused on better 
modelling and understanding of financial system and macroeconomic risk and instability, and 
the EU FP7 Flagship project FuturICT focused on developing new methods to integrate 
different scientific models, data and concepts, in order to create a paradigm shift from system 
components towards evaluating their interactions and emergent collective dynamics. The 
evolving understanding of systemic risk reveals what data are relevant for evaluations, and 
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informs decisions on creating new regulatory databases maintained by national and 
international regulatory authorities and collected from financial institutions. Therefore, a 
further challenge to systemic risk evaluation is that awareness of data relevance is rising 
gradually, some data relevance may not yet be revealed or relevant data may not yet be 
available or have only been collected over a short recent period. Thus research should also 
answer database questions regarding data and data frequencies that will support effective 
systemic risk evaluation and regulation. Finally, though there is widespread support for using 
regulatory policy to reduce systemic risk, regulation is still in its initial stages. There is a 
consensus that the direct and indirect costs of a systemic crisis are enormous as opposed to 
preventing it, and that without regulation the externalities will not be prevented as market 
participants are directly motivated to protect themselves but not the financial system as a 
whole, and the effects can spread to the real economy (Anabtawi and Schwarcz, 2011). 
However, there is no consensus yet on the extent of regulation or even on the formulation of a 
systemic risk tax, and research expectations are to facilitate the regulatory process. This 
report outlines an integrated approach for systemic risk evaluation based on multiple types of 
interbank exposures through innovative modelling approaches as tensorial multilayer 
networks, suggests how to relate underlying economic data and how to extend the network to 
cover financial market information. We reason about data requirements and time scale 
effects, and outline a multi-model hypernetwork of systemic risk knowledge as a scenario 
analysis and policy support tool. The argument is that logical steps forward will incorporate 
the range of risk sources and their interrelated effects as contributions towards an overall 
systemic risk indicator, will perform an integral analysis of sources and their interrelations 
through rigorous mathematical formulation of models capturing quantitative and qualitative 
information, and will develop a domain representation framework based on knowledge 
engineering, as reasoned in (Serguieva, 2012, 2013). The incorporation of a range of risk 
sources involves identification of relevant data scope and availability, the integral analysis 
requires the formulation of multi-level models and risk measures, the instantiation of the 
hypernetwork in the systemic risk domain allows formal representation of the evolving 
understanding of systemic risk. Thus the outlined project aligns with the focus of current and 
anticipated international research initiatives and would contribute to the effort towards 
systemic risk evaluation and regulation.  
Starting with a focus on the banking system and on networks as a modelling approach, 
the review of recent articles on networks in systemic risk reveals a trend to gradually 
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introduce more than one sources of risk into the analysis while no integrated measure has 
been yet evaluated. Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) propose a simple network model and 
introduce a banking-system fragility measure. The authors study systemic risk based on 
consolidated exposure data comprising all interbank deposits, credits and loans. Caccioli et 
al. (2011) assume abstractly that each bank is characterized by a balance sheet including 
interbank assets, interbank liabilities, non-interbank deposits, illiquid assets, and the capital 
buffer. They capture characteristics of a banking system through network features, and 
investigate the contagion versus stability effects of heterogeneous degree distributions, 
heterogeneous distribution of assets, and correlations in degree. Markose at al. (2012) analyse 
interconnected US banks in the market of credit default swaps on residential mortgage 
backed securities. The authors evaluate a systemic risk penalty based on this source and 
justify it in a regulatory context as a ‘super-spreader’ tax. Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2012) 
extend their earlier technique to produce a more comprehensive analysis of network 
characteristics and a new measure for identifying systemically important institutions. They 
consider as risk sources the interbank lending exposures and the payment system flows, 
analyse a network for each of the two sources, compare network structure, and construct a 
centrality measure for each network based on several theoretical centrality measures. The 
authors emphasize the different roles the same banks play in the two networks, however do 
not suggest an integrated approach. Langfield et al. (2012) investigate a more granular 
database, build consolidated exposure networks and consolidated funding networks, and then 
breakdowns by instrument, and by further criteria like instrument maturity or underlying and 
bank type. The authors produce statistics by network and recognise the significant difference 
in network structure for different instruments. As a step towards an integrated analysis, they 
apply a simple clustering technique and visualise a consolidated inter-cluster exposures 
network and a consolidated inter-cluster funding network. The clustering is based on factors 
like unsecured lending, secured lending, marketable securities, net credit default swaps sold, 
securities financing transactions, and derivatives exposure. As a note, these instruments are 
also the elements of the consolidated interbank exposures, while interbank funding 
consolidates unsecured lending, secured lending, and repo. No integrated measure of 
systemic risk is suggested, neither an integrated network structure detailing links between 
networks. Markose (2013) re-emphasizes the use of the eigen-pair method for systemic risk 
analytics in evaluating system stability and in ranking systemically important institutions, and 
reasons on introducing a progressive Pigou tax called super-spreader tax as a stabilizing 
mechanism. The author presents a comprehensive review of systemic risk research and 
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recognizes in a stylized form the broader scope of interconnections necessary to consider in 
order to soundly support a macroprudential policy. The paper directs towards possible use of 
hypergraphs though no integrated structure and measure are evaluated. 
An evident feature of systemic risk research is the dependence on data availability. 
Identifying relevant data, data collection from financial institutions, and developing databases 
is an ongoing process for regulatory authorities. The importance of understanding systemic 
risk for maintaining financial stability is widely recognized, however the progress in 
developing effective approaches is gradual and does not meet the emergency of the task. 
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2010, 2012) argue that this is due to both the difficulty of the task 
and the lack of necessary data. The authors are only able to perform a comprehensive 
analysis, as the Mexican central bank has detailed and daily data on the institutions 
comprising the Mexican banking system, which allows calculating matrices of interbank 
exposures since January 2005 onwards. The data intensive investigation in Langfield et al. 
(2012) is only possible due to the new regulatory UK dataset on interbank exposures broken 
down by counterparty and instrument. The exposures are collected from banks over six-
month periods since the first reporting period of July-December 2011, and the dataset is 
currently collected and maintained by the Prudential Regulation Authority within the Bank of 
England. According to the authors, this dataset is the most granular representation of a large 
interbank market available worldwide. The development of the super-spreader tax in Markose 
at al. (2012) is facilitated by the data on US banks involved in the credit default swaps (CDS) 
market, as recorded in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Call Reports. Bilateral 
exposures or netted bilateral exposures are not available, but rather the data for each financial 
institution are accessible as its market share in terms of gross notional on the sell side of 
CDS, gross notional on the buy side, gross negative fair value for which the institution is a 
guarantor, and gross positive fair value for which it is beneficiary. The authors devise an 
algorithm that randomly allocates the unobserved bilateral exposures, while meeting as 
constraints the gross values and the existing concentration of market share. The logical and 
creative analysis in Caccioli et al. (2011) is restricted by not being based on real data. 
Academic research on systemic risk is largely restricted to publicly available incomplete data, 
and therefore the analysis of interbank markets makes assumptions regarding unobserved 
relationships. A number of papers show the significant difference in the analysis and 
conclusions or even misleading results, when based on complete data versus assumed 
unobserved relationships, e.g. Mistrulli (2011) and Cont et al. (2013). Research based at 
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regulatory institutions benefits from access to new regulatory datasets related to systemic 
risk. These are however recently initiated and continuously refined in terms of definition and 
scope of relevant data. The UK regulatory dataset on interbank exposures, as an example, is 
initiated with the Recovery and Resolution Plans (FSA, 2011) and the submission templates 
and instructions are being refined since the first reporting exercise collected by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) in early 2012 through the current fourth data request being 
collected in mid-2013 by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), while taking into 
account the feedback from UK banks and the developments at international regulatory 
authorities as the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Detailed understanding of how banks are 
interconnected at global level is a key priority for FSB, as initiated with the consultation 
paper on financial linkages (FSB, 2011) and as recently reported with the successful 
implementation of phase one of the data gaps initiative (FSB, 2013), including the start in 
2013 of the harmonized collection of improved data on exposures for major systemic banks. 
An international data hub hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) will hold the 
confidential data, and participating national supervisory authorities have formed a 
Governance Group to oversee the pooling and sharing of information. We support the 
argument that the soundness and effectiveness of developed research methodologies and 
produced systemic risk analysis depends on the scope of available data. 
This report emphasizes that a logical step forward would incorporate a range of risk 
sources as contributions towards an overall systemic risk measure, and would perform an 
integral analysis of sources and their interrelations through rigorously formulated 
mathematical models. Maintaining the focus on network approaches and the banking system, 
one can present arguments that networks have been prevailingly implemented as visualisation 
tools to systemic risk rather than as rigorous analytical and knowledge discovery approaches, 
that single networks or interconnected networks do not meet the task for integral analysis of 
multiple risk sources and alternative structures as ‘networks of networks’ or ‘multi-level’ 
networks are required, as reasoned in (Serguieva, 2012, 2013). Recent methodology 
developments can facilitate the work towards constructing approaches with required 
capabilities. The mathematical formulation introduced by De Domenico et al. (2013), 
captures complex networks with multiple subnetworks and layers of connectivity. A tensorial 
framework is formalised to study multilayer networks and to generalise network descriptors. 
It has not been applied to systemic risk modelling, however it will allow us to adequately 
expand the interbank network construction in Langfield et al. (2012) and simultaneously 
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incorporate into multilayers risk sources like unsecured lending, secured lending, marketable 
securities, net credit default swaps sold, securities financing transactions, and derivatives 
exposure by type of derivative. The formalisation will further allow us to recalculate single-
instrument measures, e.g. the centrality measure suggested in Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2012) 
and the super-spreader tax presented in Markose et al. (2012), now based on the complex 
network or based on any scope within that network. Furthermore, the canonical tensors for 
each layer in the network can be evaluated based on macroeconomic indicators and financial 
market indicators, while the adjacency tensors also include interbank exposures. Thus a 
broader underlying structure will affect the observed structure of interbank exposures. Next, 
each of the instruments now included in the multi-layer network is traded on different 
markets, and we can zoom into the layer for an instrument and consider banks as trading 
agents. We can introduce additional layers under that layer by translating the hypergraph 
market structure accommodating for coexisting exchanges from (Malamud and Rostek, 2013) 
into the tensorial formalisation. This will allows us within the same structure to simulate the 
markets that affect systemic risk network formation. Malamud and Rostek (2013) work at the 
level of markets only and assume strategic traders though do not analyse with real data. On 
the other hand, the simulation can be based on samples from the Bloomberg database and 
from the recently developed regulatory SABRE database maintained initially by FSA and 
now by PRA and containing information on transaction prices, sizes, time, location and 
counterparty. This will allow identifying from data different types of strategic traders, and 
improving the quality of simulation. For example, Benos and Sagade (2012) use samples 
from the Bloomberg and SABRE databases to analyse market structure. Cogently, we 
consider market structure as contributing to the overall systemic risk structure and affecting 
the structure in the other layers of the systemic risk network. The markets in some of the 
instruments can be augmented to include players and strategies explicitly allowing leverage, 
as the ones described in (Thurner et al., 2012).  
Reasonable arguments exist, as final points here, that no approach has been suggested 
for capturing the evolution of systemic risk structures through time, and that the development 
is pending of a domain representation framework suitable for instantiation in the broader 
systemic risk knowledge domain, as reasoned in (Serguieva 2012, 2013). We support the 
view regarding the evolution of structure that it itself communicates structure. Time-
dependent networks are studied in Braha and Bar-Yam (2010) concluding that static network 
analysis loses valuable information embedded in dynamic networks, that networks follow a 
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“multiscale” dynamics where structure varies significantly both between time scales and over 
time, and that a more agile strategy of monitoring and centrality evaluation is necessary. The 
study is based on single-layer social networks, and it is important to examine now the 
relevance of these conclusions to multilayer interbank exposures networks. The diffusion 
equations from (De Domenico et al., 2013; Gomez et al., 2013) will be further examined, as 
they account for intra-layer and inter-layer diffusion and can study time-scales in complex 
networks, following the argument that interlayer connections can generate new structural and 
dynamical correlations between components of a system and affect information diffusion. In 
order to next address capturing the evolution of structure under incomplete information, we 
will investigate the suitability of (Minku and Yao, 2012) as a knowledge discovery approach 
to dealing with structural drifts in the multilayer network. The above approaches can 
contribute to generalising time-dependent multilayer networks and dynamic processes. 
Further generalisation is introduced through developing a representation framework for the 
broader systemic risk knowledge domain, expanding beyond the banking system, 
encompassing the financial sector and linking to the real economy. As a first step, influence 
beyond the banking system is introduced within the tensorial multilayer network 
corresponding to interbank exposures. The canonical basis at each layer, i.e. for each type of 
exposure, can be identified through principal component analysis based on factors including 
macroeconomic variables. Thus economic structure and cyclicality will affect systemic risk 
structure. Furthermore, when zooming into the layer for each exposure instrument and 
presenting the market for that instrument, the corresponding market structure and leverage 
effects will influence the systemic risk structure. The generalizations described in this 
paragraph will allow not only representing but also discovering network structure.  
Finally, further macro and micro information within the financial sector, the housing 
market, and other real economy sectors, is relevant to systemic risk and has been effectively 
explored through various modelling and analytical approaches that do not lend themselves 
directly as extensions of the tensorial exposures network introduced above but constitute 
viable current knowledge on systemic risk. Then, we can refer to techniques in knowledge 
engineering and construct a systemic risk domain where a model is considered as a unit of 
knowledge, i.e. models are the language for expressing systemic risk knowledge, and the 
exposures network is one of the models. A multiple–model domain framework is suggested 
in Serguieva (2004) where models are positioned along dimensions - imprecision being one 
of them while the other dimensions can be instantiated as meaningful ontologies for a 
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particular domain. The author introduces the imprecision perspective as benefiting from the 
generalised theory of uncertainty (Zadeh, 2006), and then considers a model as a generalised 
constraint on information where a different relational type in a constraint communicates 
different type of uncertainty, and finally formulates multi-perspective generalised constraints 
to translate the domain into multiple constraints involving multi-perspective relational types 
unfolding on domain-specific dimensions. It is further reasoned that different combinations of 
constraints will be able to solve different user-defined queries to the knowledge base varying 
in scope and focus, however no structure formalisation is suggested for such groupings of 
models, and the framework is not instantiated in the systemic risk domain. Relevant 
formalisation here can be introduced through hypernetworks and hypersimplices (Johnson, 
2014), by considering each model as a node, each groupings of models as a hypersimplex 
answering a particular systemic risk query or a policy query, and the domain as a 
hypernetwork. As systemic risk knowledge evolves, the hypersimplex of models answering 
the same query this year may differ from the hypersimplex next year, and we are identifying 
techniques for domain evolution. The purpose is to introduce a rigorous mathematical 
formalisation for describing and evolving the systemic-risk hypernetwork domain, while still 
capturing quantitative and qualitative relations. Only then it will transform as an effective 
decision support or policy support knowledge system facilitating scenario analysis and policy 
decisions. Importantly, domain evolution brings about the evolution of the underlying data 
structure.  
The description above of the integrated systemic risk approach in first approximation, 
is followed next by introducing each stage step by step. Starting with the construction of the 
tensorial interbank exposures network layer by layer, it will cover the following exposures: 
total prime lending, total issuer risk, total securities financing transactions exposure, total 
derivatives exposure at default, and total short-term lending. Within total issuer risk a 
differentiation will be made between marketable securities and net credit default swaps sold, 
while total derivatives exposure at default will breakdown by underlying asset class, and the 
total prime lending will be combined with total short-term lending while the focus is on 
unsecured and secured lending. Thus the following layers are included: 
▫ unsecured lending (by counterparty) – the prime lending includes all 
drawn lending facilities, whether part of a committed facility or not, for 
which the counterparty has not pledged collateral, and includes wholesale 
deposits with a maturity of one year or more and all undrawn and 
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committed unsecured facilities; the short-term money placement includes 
all unsecured placement with maturity less than one year including excess 
reserves sold at the inter-bank lending rate, such as Fed Funds, 
Eurocurrency or equivalent, and includes  operating accounts, demand 
deposit accounts, money market deposit accounts, commercial paper, 
certificate of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, commercial paper sweeps, and 
certificate of deposit sweeps. 
▫ secured lending (by counterparty) - all drawn lending facilities, whether 
part of a committed facility or not, for which the counterparty has pledged 
collateral; all undrawn and committed secured facilities. 
▫ marketable securities (by issuer or obligator) - total mark-to-market (MtM) 
value of equity and fixed-income instruments reported as positive (long 
issuer risk) or negative (short issuer risk), excluding asset-backed securities 
and covered bonds. 
▫ net credit default swaps sold (by reference entity) - CDS bought or sold 
should include both over-the-counter (OTC) and centrally cleared contracts, 
as the exposure is to the reference entity of the contract not to the 
counterparty; the net notional CDS (bought and sold) values here are the net 
of values reported for notional CDS bought and notional CDS sold, and the 
net value can be positive (long issuer risk) or negative (short issuer risk), 
while the interest is in the net CDS sold or the short issuer risk. 
▫ securities financing transactions (by counterparty) - all securities 
lending/borrowing as well as repos and reverse repos; gross notional and net 
exposure are reported in positive terms, where gross notional is for the 
mark-to-market amount of the securities or cash lent/borrowed and the net 
exposure is be the amount of exposure net of collateral. 
▫ interest-rate derivatives exposure at default (by counterparty) – includes 
only bilateral OTC interest-rate derivatives exposures rather than those 
through central counterparties; net MtM before collateral is the total net by 
counterparty MtM exposure of all OTC interest-risk derivatives positions 
where these transactions are only netted within netting sets and a netting set 
is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement; net MtM 
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after collateral is the sum over netting sets of the net MtM before collateral 
within a set less collateral received within that set, and net MtM after 
collateral for the counterparty is not necessarily equal to net MtM before 
collateral less collateral for the counterparty; collateral posted in excess is 
the sum of all collateral posted (or unreturned collateral) by the reporting 
bank to a counterparty in excess of the derivatives payables to the 
counterparty, as this excess captures the resulting credit exposure the 
reporting bank has to the counterparty for netting sets where the reporting 
bank is out-of-the-money; banks report interest-rate derivatives exposure at 
default as the resulting counterparty credit risk exposure net of collateral 
evaluated either using the MtM method, the standardised method, or the 
internal model method. 
▫ FX derivatives exposure at default (by counterparty) – as above but for 
derivatives with currency as underlying. 
▫ credit derivatives exposure at default (by counterparty) – as above but for 
the corresponding underlying. 
▫ equity derivatives exposure at default (by counterparty. 
▫ commodities derivatives exposure at default (by counterparty). 
 
To construct a layer in the network, we follow the tensorial network description in 
(De Domenico et al., 2013) for a layer k
~
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where N is the number of nodes in  in layer k
~
 and L is the number of layers. Then, in the 
context of a national banking system, the number of nodes in each layer is equal to the 
number of banks in the system, and the number of layers is L=10 corresponding to the types 
of interbank exposures described above. The intensity of the relationship from bank in  to 
bank jn  in layer k
~
 is indicated with  kwij
~
 and can be evaluated from the exposures along 
instrument k
~
. Next,  kijE ~,  denotes the    component of the tensor in the canonical basis 
for layer k
~
, and can be evaluated by identifying macroeconomic indicators and financial  
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Fig 1: Multiple layers in the interbank exposures network 
Here we first construct the network layer by layer,  
and then build the interlayer links and link dynamics 
 
market indicators correlated with the instrument in layer k
~
, then perform principal 
component analysis of the identified factors and regress this type of exposure along the 
orthogonal principal components.For example, factors affecting the losses of Mexican 
financial institutions (Solorzano-Margain et al, 2013), and therefore their exposures, are 
identified in another context as: 
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▫ Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) 
▫ Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) 
▫ Nikkei Heikin Kabuka (Nikkei) 
▫ Bovespa: Brazilian stock market index 
▫ Treasury bill (T-bill) yield with maturities of  3600,720,180,90t  
▫ London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) yield with maturities of 
 360,180,30,7t  
▫ Mexican treasury bond yields without taxes with maturities of 
 5460,3600,1800,720,364,182,91,28t  
▫ Mexican treasury bond yields with taxes with maturities of 
 10920,3600,1800,720,480,364,182,91,28,1t  
▫ FX peso-dollar 
▫ Real rate of Mexican bonds against inflation with taxes with maturities of 
1,800 days 
▫ Real rate of Mexican bonds against inflation without taxes with maturities 
of 1,800 days 
▫ Spread on saving protection bonds with maturities of 1,080 days 
▫ Spread on saving protection bonds with quarterly payments with maturities 
of 1,080 days 
▫ Spread on monetary regulation bonds with maturities of 365 days 
▫ Spread on development government bonds 
▫ Swap internal interbank equilibrium rate yield with maturities of 
 7200,3600,1800,364,91,28,1t  
▫ National index of producer prices of non-residential rental buildings 
▫ IPC: index of the Mexican stock exchange 
We target to evaluate each stage of the approach for different countries – UK, Italy, Mexico, 
US – and the above set will be identified for each country. Within a national network, though 
starting at each layer with the same set of factors, different subsets of them may be correlated 
to the instrument of that layer and different sets of principal components may be identified at 
each layer. Thus the tensorial network allows for a richer structure within a layer. Next, 
 kW ~  is the    component of the adjacency tensor for layer k
~
. Furthermore, the 
multilayer adjacency tensor 


~
~M  is expressed as: 
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where  khij ~~~~

  is the tensors of the canonical basis in the space LLNN  , in  is a bank in 
layer h
~
, and jn  is a node in layer k
~
. We consider similar approach when evaluating 
canonical tensors between layers as the one described above about within layers, but will now 
include financial statement information as factors, as the type of multilayer network will be 
prevailingly (though not restricted to) multiplex.  
The exposure data are available in different countries at different frequencies. In the 
UK exposure data are collected at 6-month intervals, and in Mexico the availability of daily 
data is claimed. On the other hand, Braha and Bar-Yam (2010) conclude by evaluating social 
networks that different nodes have high centrality at different time scales on average. 
Network centrality measures contribute to identifying systemically important banks, and 
current regulatory expectations do not exceed evaluating centrality in a static network 
topology over relatively long periods. We will investigate, subject to data availability, the 
time scale effects, across countries, across types of exposures and along integrated exposures, 
and suggest a more agile strategy of monitoring or measure of centrality if the analysis directs 
towards that. Centrality measures (De Domenico et al., 2013) will be evaluated: 
▫ degree centrality and strength centrality 
 monoplex: degree centrality  id  of node in  for unweighted 

W  
  strenght centrality  is  of node in  for weighted 

W   
       ,, ieuWisid 

   (3) 
  where u  is 1-vector,  ie

 is a contravariant canonical vector 
 multilayer: multi-degree centrality 
D   
     uUMkhdD
L
kh
~
~
~
~
1,
~~
 

, (4) 
  where  khd ~~  is the interlayer degree centrality vector 
  corresponding to layers h
~
 and k
~
, and 


~
~U  is 1-tensor. 
 multilayer: the weighted adjacency tensor 
LL

~
~  can be used as a  
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   basis to formulate a strength measure, where  
        
 







L
kh
kh
L
kh
N
ji
ij khEqUkhijkhwUM
1,
~
~~~
1
~
,
~
1,
~
~
~
~
~
~
~~~~~~ 











  
   and 
kh
q ~~  sums weights in connections between layers h
~
 and k
~
. 
 projected monoplex:  degree and strength centrality can be formulated for the  
   projected monoplex obtained from the multilayer network, where  
   the projected network is described with 






~
~
~
~UMP  . 
▫ eigencentrality 
 monoplex: eigencentrality vector 

  vWv
1
1
  (5) 
  where 1  is the largest eigenvalue of 

W  and v  is its  
  corresponding eigenvector. 
 multilayer:  eigecentrality tensor 


 ~
~
~
1
1~ VMV
  (6) 
  where 1  is the largest eigenvalue of M and ~V  is the  
  corresponding eigentensor. 
Further network centrality measures as betweenness, closeness, and Page Rank 
centrality (Martinez-Jaramillo, 2012) will be translated for tensorial networks – monoplex, 
projected and multilayer - and evaluated across countries and time scales. A single centrality 
measure will be formulated based on the different types of centrality, and its robustness will 
be evaluated along time scales. A more agile strategy of monitoring will be proposed, if the 
analysis reveals necessary, and a good indicator will be proposed of a bank’s systemic 
importance.  
Existing proposed taxes or capital surcharges for banks spreading systemic risk can be 
translated for the tensorial network, and new will be proposed now based on the wider 
approach. For example the tax used in (Markose et al., 2012), based on one instruments as a 
cause of systemic risk, and aiming at banks with high eigencentrality to internalize the costs 
their failure will cause to others and to mitigate their impact on system instability. When 
exposures in a layer of the tensorial network are calculated as proportion of total capital of 
exposed banks, and system instability is given by the largest eigenvalue 1 , and networks are 
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directed along exposures, then we have to use the Katz centrality modification of 
eigencentrality for monoplex where a1 : 
   uaWv
1
  
 
 
Fig 2: Multiplex exposures network – the structure here will be 
 further extended by unfolding each of these layers into its market. 
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The capital surcharge for bank i is introduced as proportionate to the i
th
 element of the 
eigenvector  icv  and included in the total capital of bank i, and the network is re-evaluated 
to determine the level of c that stabilizes the system. Such levels can be determined for each 
instrument presented as a monoplex network, and an analogous procedure will be formulated 
for the projected and the multi-layer network. The next step is to extend the network by 
zooming into each layer and model the market for the instrument of that layer, while 
preserving the multilayer tensorial framework, e.g. by incorporating multilayer markets 
(Malamud and Rostek, 2013) and allowing for leverage strategies (Thurner at al., 2012). 
As argued in (Anabtawi and Schwarcz, 2011; Schwarcz, 2011), either banking system 
structure or financial markets structure can lead to cascading failures, and systemic risk 
analysis and regulation should focus on both. We are currently considering suitable 
multiagent, complex network, and ensemble approaches to modelling financial markets, 
particularly with the purpose to identify structure at different granularity, to discover dynamic 
structure, and to differentiate between signals in structure change – which ones to react to and 
avoide a crisis and which ones to note but not over-react to, as reasoned in (Serguieva, 2013). 
Details will be provided in the next extended version of this report. We expect to be able to 
contribute to the CRISIS project in this aspect. Finally, models developed throughout this 
work, and further models of the banking system, the broader financial system and financial 
markets, the housing market and economic sectors, as relevant to systemic risk, will be 
carefully selected and (meta)linked within a knowledge hypernetwork on systemic risk 
serving as a knowledge base for enquiries and policy scenarios. This will align with further 
new EU research initiatives on developing an economic and financial exploratory through a 
variety of modelling approaches and investigating all aspects of risk and stability. 
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